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ARTICLE

Ensuring that Imported Biofuels Abide by
Domestic Environmental Standards: Will the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Tolerate Asymmetrical Compliance Regimes?
DANIELLE SPIEGEL FELD'

I.

INTRODUCTION

From an environmental standpoint, not all biofuels are alike.
If produced from sustain ably harvested feedstocks using energy
efficient production processes, biofuels can help to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the transportation sector.1
If, however, biofuels are produced from unsustainably harvested
feedstocks using energy intensive production processes, biofuels
can have the opposite GHG effect,2 causing significant nonclimate related environmental harm as well.3

* Nee Danielle Spiegel, Ph.D fellow, Copenhagen University Faculty of Law.

This article was originally prepared for, and presented at, the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature's 2011 conference on "Biofuels Law and
Policy," hosted by the University of Ottawa. It is current as of September 10,
2011. The author would like to thank Tomer Broude and Stephanie Switzer for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts as well as Peter Pagh and Laura
Nielsen for their continued guidance throughout my research efforts.
1. The Complicated Case of Biofuels, WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 29, 2006),
http://www .wri.org/stories/2006/11/complicated -case-biofuels (explaining how
biofuels are a potentially carbon neutral fuel source because the amount of
carbon that is released into the atmosphere upon burning a biomass-based fuel
corresponds to the amount of carbon that the biomass sequestered during the
growing period).
2. As Joseph Fargione et al. explained in their seminal article, "whether
biofuels offer carbon savings depends on how they are produced." Joseph
Fargione et aI., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCI. 1235, 1235
(2008). So-called first-generation production methods, which convert the edible
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portions of corn, soybeans and other food-crops into fuel, are particularly
problematic from a GHG emissions perspective. Concerns regarding firstgeneration fuels relate to a phenomenon known as "indirect land use changes"
(ILUC). The theory behind ILUCs derives from the fact that using food crops for
biofuel production puts pressure on food prices in commodity markets, which
incentivizes farmers around the world to plant more acres of the newly lucrative
crops. Some farmers will respond to the increased demand for the biofuels crop
by diverting existing croplands to the production of the biofuel crop. This is
known as direct land use changes. Others, however, will respond to the global
demand increase by clearing virgin forests and grasslands to create additional
farm land. The clearing of land in turn causes stored carbon to be released into
the atmosphere and decreases the potential for future carbon sequestration.
This chain of events is known as indirect-land use changes. See generally
Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of u.s. Croplands for Biofuels Increases
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCI. 1238
(2008). Fargione et al. estimated that "converting rainforests, peatlands,
savannas or grasslands to produce food crop-based biofuels in Brazil, Southeast
Asia, and the United States creates a 'biofuel carbon debt' by releasing
seventeen to 420 times more C02 than the annual greenhouse gas (GHG)
reductions that these biofuels would provide by displacing fossil fuels."
Fargione, supra, at 1235. Tim Searchinger et al. reached a similar conclusion
regarding the scale of GHG emissions reductions caused by land changes. See
Searchinger, supra, at 1239.
A number of researchers have criticized the scientific rigor of the Fargione
and Searchinger studies. See, e.g., Herbert Halleux et al., Comparative Life
Cycle Assessment of Two Biofuels: Ethanol from Sugar Beet and Rapeseed
Methyl Esther, 13 INT'L J. OF LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT 184, 184 (2008) (noting
that neither the Fargione nor Searchinger studies are based on empirical
studies and that both papers contain "assumptions that could be critically
discussed"). However, as Gregory M. Perry et al. have noted, "[t]he general
criticisms regarding both the Fargione and Searchinger studies did not reject
claims of negative environmental effects. Instead, the debate seemed to be more
of size, scope, and effect." GREGORY PERRY ET AL., BIOFUELS PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES: SOlVIE FACTS AND ANSWERS TO COMMON
QUESTIONS 14 (2008), available at http://arec.oregonstate.edu/sites/default/files/
faculty/perry /q adocument5. pdf.
Unlike first-generation biofuels, so-called advanced biofuels make use of
non-food crops, such as biomass waste, as well as the non-edible portion of food
crops, such as the corn stover. As a result, the production of advanced does not
generally affect commodities markets for food crops and thereby avoids
incentivizing the land conversion that first generation fuels cause. See Madhu
Khanna, Christine L. Crago & Mairi Black, Can Biofuels Be a Solution to
Climate Change? The Implications of Land Use Change-Related Emissions for
Policy, 1 INTERFACE Focus 233, 236 (2011); See also Lian P. Koh et al., Biofuels:
Waste Not Want Not, 320 SCI. 1419 (2008) (touting the GHG-saving benefits of
biofuels derived from woody biomass).
3. See generally R. Dominguez-Faus et al., The Water Footprint of Biofuels:
A Drink or Drive Issue? 43 ENVT. SCI. & TECH. 3005 (2009) (production of firstgeneration biofuels aggravates traditional water pollution problems caused by
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After years of undifferentiated support, the United States
Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA)4 in 2007, which sought to selectively promote biofuels that
are considered environmentally sustainable.5 Citing the added
difficulty of policing the conditions under which foreign biofuels
are produced, the regulations that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) drafted to implement the EISA, known as the
"Renewable Fuel Standard Program" (RFS2), require foreign
producers to follow some more exacting procedures to
demonstrate compliance with the EISA's environmental
requirements than their domestic counterparts. As described
below, EPA's claim that the added difficulty of foreign
enforcement calls for additional compliance procedures is
plausible.6 Not surprisingly, though, foreign biofuels producers
have cried foul. The harshest criticism has come from the
Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA), traditionally
the largest ethanol exporter in the world.7
Specifically, in
response to EPA's proposed RFS2 rulemaking, UNICA submitted
comments alleging that the imposltlOn of any additional
compliance obligations on foreign producers violates the United
States' duties under the law of the World Trade Organization,
including Article III and XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)8 as well as Article 2 of the Agreement on

farming such as nitrogen runoff and nitrogen-based groundwater pollution and
taxes water supplies, including in regions where water is scarce, because firstgeneration biofuels increase demand for crops, thereby stimulating additional
agriculture). Converting virgin habitat to agricultural land also threatens
biodiversity. See generally David Tilman et al., Carbon-Negative Biofuels from
Law-Input High-Diversity Grassland Biomass, 314 SCI. 1598 (2006).
4. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7001-8386
(2006).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27 -38.
6. See infra notes 40-42 with accompanying text.
7. Though Brazil had long been the largest ethanol exported in the world,
the United States is on track to be the leading ethanol exporter for 2011. See
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., U.S. ON TRACK TO BECOlVIE WORLD'S LARGEST ETHANOL
EXPORTER IN 2011 (2011), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/IATR/
072011_EthanoLIATRasp.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 UN.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).9 The European Commission
complained to EPA about the asymmetry in the proposed RFS2
compliance procedures as well, albeit less bluntly. 10
Conventional wisdom suggests that, where it applies, the
TBT Agreement imposes more onerous obligations on members of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) than does the GATT
alone.ll At least part of the fear that the TBT Agreement
inspires derives from the fact that it contains no obvious analogue
to Article XX of the GATT, which provides members with an
opportunity to maintain otherwise GATT inconsistent measures
that serve legitimate non-protectionist goals.I2 Moreover, most
commentators believe that GATT Article XX could not be invoked
to justify a TBT violation.I3 As such, if one assumes the TBT
Agreement covers the sort of environmental criteria that the
9. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal
Instruments·Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 UN.T.S. 120 (1994)
[hereinafter TET Agreement]; See also JOEL VELASCO, BRAZILIAN SUGARCANE
INDUS. ASS'N (UNICA), COMMENT ON PROPOSED REGULATION OF FUELS AND FUEL
ADDITIVES: CHANGES TO RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM (2009)
[hereinafter UNICA's Comments], available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#ldocumentDetail;D~EPA-HQ·OAR·2005·0161·1761.
For a description of
UNICA's allegations, see infra notes 46-49 with accompanying text.
10. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMlVIENTS TO PROPOSED REGULATION OF FUELS

AND FUEL ADDITIVES: CHANGES TO RENEWABLE FuEL STANDARD PROGRAM (2009),

available

at

http://www .regulations.gov /#!documentDetail;D=EPA- HQ-OAR-

2005·0161·2020.

11. See, e.g., Jan MacDonald, Domestic Regulation, International Standards
and Technical Barriers to Trade, 4 WORLD TRADE R. 249, 252 n.3 (2005).
12. In pertinent part, Article XX provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to
protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health; (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement ... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. GATT, supra
note 8 at 37·38.

13. See Part III, infra, for more discussion on the relationship between
Article XX and the TET Agreement.
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RFS2 sets forth, as a number of scholars have suggested,14
UNICA's TBT claims appear quite threatening.
However, upon close examination of the TBT Agreement, it is
far from clear that Article 2 of the TBT Agreement covers the
compliance measures that UNI CA challenges. In fact, there is
good reason to question whether the TBT Agreement applies to
the dispute at all. If it does not, the hypothetical case would be
considered under the rules of the GATT alone, with the resulting
possibility of justifying the asymmetry under Article XX.15
14. See e.g., Andrew D. Mitchell & Christopher Tan, The Consistency of the
EU Renewable Energy Directive with the WTO Agreements (Georgetown Law,
Georgetown Business, Economics & Regulatory Law Research Paper No.
1485549,
2009),
available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi ?article= 1121 &context=fwp s_papers&seiredir=1#search=%22Consistency%20EU%20Renewable%20Energy%20Directive
%20WTO%20Agreements%22 (arguing that the minimum lifecycle GHG
emissions criteria contained in the EU Sustainability Criteria for biofuels are
covered by the TET Agreement); see also JANE EARLEY, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE

DEV.,

US

TRADE

POLICIES

ON

BIOFUELS

AND

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT 11 (2009), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/
2009/04015.pdf (stating with respect to the RFS2 environmental criteria that,
"Discrimination on the basis of performance of different kinds of feedstock may
at some point pose a problem [under the TBT Agreement],,); CAL. ENERGY COMM.
& CAL. AIR RES. BOARD, CEC·600·2007·011·CMF, STATE ALTERNATIVE FuELS
PLAN 82-87 (2007) (suggesting the lifecycle emissions criteria contained in the
California Low Carbon Fuel Standard would be subject to scrutiny under the
TBT Agreement).
15. Notably, in an early WTO case, the Appellate Body (AB) refused to allow
the U.S. to use Article XX(g) to justify the asymmetry of an environmental
regulation that was found to violate Article IIl:4. See Appellate Body Report,
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WTIDS2/ABIR (Apr. 29 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline].
However, unlike the compliance procedures of the RFS2 that UNICA now
challenges, the measures at issue in U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline created
relatively more stringent substantive obligations on foreign producers by
requiring them to use a less advantageous method of calculating the baseline
from which the pollutant composition of a fuel would be measured. It is quite
possible that the AB would be more sympathetic to asymmetrical regimes that
do not alter the substantive standards to which each group is held, as is the case
in the RFS2 regime. See infra note 43 (describing the requirements in the RFS2
that UNICA challenges).
Moreover, it is important to recognize that U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline did
not hold that asymmetrical regulations could never be justified under Article
XX(g). To the contrary, the AB made clear that the fact that the rule treated
foreign parties differently did not preclude the U.S. from successfully justifying
the measure under Article XX(g). See U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline, supra, at 21
("[t]here is, of course, no textual basis [in Article XX(g)] for requiring identical
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It is important for all WTO members who seek to curb the
flow of unsustainable biofuels into their markets to understand
the ways in which the TBT Agreement may constrain their efforts
to craft effective compliance regimes for the implementation of
cross-border environmental objectives. To that end, this article
uses UNICA's challenge to the RFS2 as a case study for
examining the extent to which the TBT Agreement prohibits
WTO members from imposing asymmetrical compliance burdens
on foreign and domestic biofuels producers.
The analysis
proceeds in four parts. Part II presents background information
on the relevant United States biofuels legislation and outlines
UNICA's claims against the U.S. legislation. Part III then
presents a brief history of the TBT Agreement and its
relationship to the GATT. In Part IV, the examination turns to
explore the scope of the TBT Agreement in general and Article 2
in particular. It surmises that if the Agreement applies to this
treatment of domestic and imported products. Indeed, where there is identity of
treatment - constituting real, not merely formal, equality of treatment - it is
difficult to see how inconsistency with Article IlI:4 would have arisen in the first
place."). While the AB asserted that the U.S. was under a duty to "explore
adequately means .
of mitigating the administrative problems relied on as
justification for [the disputed measure]" and to "count the costs" that the
differential treatment of foreign entities would entail, it did not state that the
U.S. was required to ensure that the measures decided upon imposed equal
costs on all parties. See U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline, supra, at 28. And in fact,
the modified Rule that EPA drafted in response to the U.S.-Reformulated
Gasoline ruling continues to require that foreign refiners follow some additional
procedures to ensure adequate monitoring, verification and enforcement. See
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for Gasoline
Produced by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533, 45,533 (Aug. 28, 1997) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80) C[t]his final action also includes additional
requirements that address issues that are unique to refiners and refineries
located outside the United States, namely those related to tracking the
movement of gasoline from the refinery to the United States border, monitoring
compliance with the requirements applicable to foreign refiners, and imposition
of appropriate sanctions for violations."). None of the parties to the original
U.S.-Reformulated Gasoline dispute has challenged the WTO consistency of the
final rule as amended.
Finally, it is worth noting that there were explicit indications that the
measure at issue in US-Reformulated Gasoline had been developed expressly in
order to protect U.S. fuel refineries. See e.g., Panel Report, United StatesStandards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ~ 2.13, WTIDS21R (Jan.
29, 1996). While the AB did not formally credit this information in its reasoning,
it is likely that it nonetheless impacted its analysis of the U.S. compliance with
the chapeau of Art. XX.
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dispute at all, Article 5, not Article 2, would govern the
disposition of UNICA's claims. Accordingly, Part V analyzes
UNICA's Article 2 claims under the rubric of Article 5. This
analysis suggests that Article 5 leaves sufficient regulatory space
for policy-makers to design biofuels compliance regimes as they
believe is necessary to confidently implement their sustainability
objectives, even where doing so requires imposing a greater
burden on foreign and domestic producers. Part VI concludes.
A brief disclaimer is needed before continuing further: this
article does not attempt to prove that the specific compliance
obligations that the RFS2 prescribes comply with the TBT
Agreement. Instead, it seeks to sketch the boundaries of what is
legally permissible under the TBT Agreement. The compliance
regime of the RFS2 merely serves as a vehicle to that end.
Consequently, the article will not inquire into whether the
compliance obligations that EPA designed for foreign suppliers
were motivated by genuine environmental policy concerns as
opposed to protectionist aims, or whether EPA explored all
possible alternatives to avoid imposing asymmetrical obligations.
While these points would be critical if the RFS2 were actually
challenged at the WTO, they are inapposite to an examination of
the contours of the TBT Agreement itself.
II.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE
RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD AND THE
BRAZILIAN SUGAR ASSOCIATION'S (UNICA)
CHALLENGES TO IT

a_ The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2): Its Genesis and
Structure
Contemporary American biofuels policy is an outgrowth of
the energy policy of the mid-1970s. Reeling from the OPEC oil
embargo of 1973-1974, federal legislators of the day went
searching for a source of homegrown fuel that could help wean
the nation off its dependency on imported oi1.16 Their gaze soon

16. See James A. Duffield, Ethanol Policy: Past, Present and Future, 53 S.D.
L. REV. 425, 427 ·29 (2008).
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fell upon corn,17 which grows abundantly in the United States
and can be readily converted into ethano1.18 The government has
aggressively supported the American biofuels industry, with
particular emphasis on the corn ethanol sector, ever since.19
Throughout most of this time period, federal biofuels policy
consisted of nurturing the corn ethanol industry with a slew of
subsidies, tax credits, and import tariffs.2o Then, in 2005,
Congress added another tool to its arsenal: The Energy Policy Act
of 2005 [hereinafter EPActj,21 which mandated that all
transportation fuel sold in the United States contain a minimum
volume of renewable fuel (i.e., biofuel).22 This new mandate to
use renewable fuels was called the "renewable fuel standard"
(RFS).
The RFS required blenders to incorporate at least 4 billion
gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and to steadily increase the
proportion of renewable fuel to about 7.5 billion gallons by 2012.23
To monitor compliance with the RFS mandate, each gallon of
renewable fuel was assigned a "Renewable Identification
Number" (RIN); regulated parties (i.e. fuel refiners, importers,
and blenders) were required to acquire a specified quantity of
RIN s, either through purchasing the fuel that carried them or by
purchasing RINs from other obligated parties who had used more
renewable fuel that they were statutorily required to use.24
From an environmental perspective, the RFS was fatally
flawed in that it generally treated conventional corn ethanol and

17. Id. at 428.
18. Corn-derived ethanol was also attractive to lawmakers as a substitute to
petroleum fuel because it curried favor with the powerful agricultural lobby. See
Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol: Law, Economics and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL'y
REV. 434, 461·62 (2008) (describing the public choice pathologies that have
helped garner legislative support for ethanol).
19. See id. at 438·41.
20. Id.
21. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109·58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801-16524 (2005) [hereinafter EPActj.
22. Id. § 1501(a).
23. Id.
24. OFFICE OF TRANSP. AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. EPA, EPA FINALIZES
REGULATIONS FOR A RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD (RFS) PROGRAM FOR 2007 AND
BEYOND 2 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oms/renewablefuels/
420f07019.pdf.
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more advanced, environmentally benign, biofuels alike. Although
the EP Act included some incentives to use advanced biofuelsmost notably by allowing cellulosic and waste-derived ethanol to
generate 2.5 RIN credits per everyone credit that an equivalent
volume of conventional fuel generated25-these incentives were
not powerful enough to overcome the competitive disadvantages
of cellulosic ethanol that were needed to make it an attractive
substitute to conventional corn ethanol. 26
Responding to the need to further differentiate between
sustainable and unsustainable biofuels, the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA)27 made significant changes to the
RFS. The first improvement in the amended RFS program
(RFS2) is that only biofuels which confer meaningful life-cycle
GHG savings are eligible to count toward fulfillment of the RFS2
mandate. The baseline GHG savings requirement is that all fuel
produced at facilities which "commenced construction" after
December 200728 must confer a minimum of 20 percent life-cycle
GHG reductions as compared to petroleum-based fuels.29 In
addition, a certain percentage of the total RFS2 mandate must be

25. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel
Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,713 (Mar. 26, 2010) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 80), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/
regulations.htm [hereinafter EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble].
26. Notably, despite the incentives that the EPAct provided for cellulosic
ethanol, by October of 2007, there were still no large-scale cellulosic ethanol
facilities in the United States that were either operating or under construction.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BIOFUELS IN THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION SECTOR (2007),
available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analysispaperibiomass.html. It has been
estimated that first-of-a-kind cellulosic ethanol plants cost up to five and a half
times as much as conventional ethanol plants with a similar production
capacity. See id. Beyond the facility construction costs, production costs are
also higher for cellulosic. See Jessica Leber, Economics Improve for First
Commercial Cellulosic Etharwl Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/02/16/16climatewire-economics-improve-forfirst-commercial-cell u -934 78.h tml.
27. Energy Independence and Security Act § 1522.
28. As an aside, EPA's implementing regulations grandfathered a large
percentage of corn ethanol so that most of the corn ethanol that is actually used
to fulfill the RFS2 mandate will not actually have to comply with the 20 percent
GHG reduction threshold. See Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable
Fuel Standard Eventually End Ethanol's Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 672
(2010).
29. Energy Independence and Security Act § 202(a)(I).
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fulfilled with fuels that confer more than 20 percent GHG
reductions. Specifically, the general mandate to use "renewable
fuel" includes a nested sub-mandate to consume a given quantity
of "advanced biofuels,"3o defined as those biofuels which provide
at least 50 percent GHG savings.31 Within the advance biofuels
sub-mandate, there is a further sub-mandate to use an amount of
cellulosic biofuel and biomass based diesel, which are each
required to confer at least 60 percent GHG emissions savings.32
In order to ensure that a particular type of fuel complies with
these GHG savings requirements, EPA models the lifecycle GHG
emlSSlOns associated with biofuel produced from various
feedstock and production processes.33 Mter analyzing a given
feedstock and production pathway combination-for instance,
ethanol derived from corn made at a facility that uses natural gas
for process energy-EPA decides whether that type of fuel is
eligible to count towards fulfillment of one of the nested
mandates (conventional, advanced, cellulosic, or biomass based
diesel) or is ineligible to generate RIN s at all.34 Notably, EPA
may declare that certain types of feedstocks cannot be used to
produce RIN -eligible fuel, regardless of the production process
used. At the time of this writing, EPA has not yet exercised this
option but also has not yet issued finallifecycle analyses for some
highly suspect feedstocks such as palm oil diesel.
In addition to the GHG thresholds, the RFS2 also
significantly restricts the type ofland from which RIN -generating
biofuel feedstock can be harvested.
More precisely, only
feedstocks harvested from certain types of land can be labeled
"renewable biomass,"35 and only biofuels made from "renewable
biomass" are eligible to be classified as "renewable fuel"36 and
thereby generate RIN s. These land use restrictions serve both to
30. Id. § 202(a)(2).
31. Id. § 201(1)(B)(i).
32. Id. §§ 201(1)(D), 201(1)(E).
33. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,677. Importantly,
in calculating lifecycle GHG emissions, EPA includes emissions that are the
result of Indirect Land Use Changes (ILUCs). Energy Independence and
Security Act § 201(1)(H); see supra note 2 for a discussion of ILUCs.
34. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,678.
35. Energy Independence and Security Act § 201(1)(1).
36. Id. § 201(1)(J).
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mlmmize the GHG emissions associated with the production of
the fuels, by reducing the amount of land that is cleared to grow
biofuel crops, as well as to protect biodiversity, by preventing
biologically rich land from being converted for biofuel feedstock
production.37 The most important land use restriction is that
planted crops can only be used to create RIN -eligible fuel if they
are harvested from existing agricultural land. 38
The environmental community generally lauded the
environmental safeguards of the RFS2 as being critical to the
transition towards a sustainable biofuels policy.39 The trouble
with these safeguards, however, is that they may be difficult to
enforce. As Nathaniel Greene of the Natural Resources Defense
Council noted in his testimony to the U.S. Senate, "[m]uch of the
information that EPA, or accredited certifiers, will need to
determine the lifecycle GHG emissions of different biofuels and
compliance with the definition of 'renewable biomass' can only be
gathered on the farm, in the forest, or at the biofuel refinery."40
In other words, whereas in some contexts EPA can simply
examine a product to determine whether it complies with a
technical specification, it cannot do so with a batch of biofuel
because the specifications it is concerned with in that context, by
and large, leave no trace in the final product.

37. See EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,692 (explaining
its decision to exclude rangeland from the definition of "agricultural land" on the
grounds that "the conversion of relatively undisturbed rangeland to the
production of annual crops could in some cases lead to large releases of GHGs
stored in the soil, as well as a loss of biodiversity, both of which would be
contrary to EISA's stated goals.").
38. See Energy Independence and Security Act § 201(1)(I)(i) (stating that
"renewable biomass" can only be made from "[p]lanted crops and crop residue
harvested from agricultural land that was cleared or cultivated at any time
prior to the enactment of [the EISA]").
39. See generally Environmental Protection Agency Oversight: Implementing
the Renewable Fuel Standard: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clear Air and
Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env. and Pub. Works, 1l0th Congo (2008)
(statement of Nathaniel Greene, Dir. of Renewable Energy Policy, NRDC),
available at http://docs.nrdc.org/airlfiles/air_0807ll0la.pdf.
40. See id. at 39.
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h. The Asymmetrical Compliance Procedures of the RFS2
and UNICA's Challenge to Them
As noted in the introduction, EPA argues that the need for
on·site information gathering makes it difficult to ensure that
imported biofuels comply with the RFS2's environmental criteria.
These concerns are likely exacerbated by the fact that Brazil,
again, traditionally the world's largest exporter, has a history of
unreliable compliance with and enforcement of its own domestic
environmental laws,41 which may make EPA hesitant to depend
on cooperation with the local Brazilian authorities to ensure
compliance. To compensate for these added difficulties, EPA
obligates foreign biofuel suppliers to follow some additional or
more exacting compliance procedures than domestic suppliers
must follow. EPA explains that this disparate treatment reflects
"the more limited access that EPA enforcement personnel have to
foreign entities that are regulated parties under RFS2, and also
the fact that foreign ·produced biofuel intended for export to the
U.S. is often mixed with biofuel that will not be exported to the
U.S."42
To provide an idea of the nature of asymmetry at issue here,
the following is a list of some additional compliance and
enforcement procedures that foreign biofuel producers and
importers must abide by to generate RINs. They must: submit
third party engineering reports detailing their production
process, post a bond that can be used in potential enforcement
proceedings against them as a condition to register under the
RFS2 process, physically segregate RIN ·eligible fuel from all
other fuel and keep it separate throughout the distribution
network, and satisfy additional record·keeping requirements to
document implementation ofland use restrictions.43
UNICA claims the additional obligations impose "substantial
administrative impediments"44 and "prohibitive costs"45 on
41. Colin Crawford, Defending Public Prosecutors and Defining Brazil's
Environmental "Public Interest"; A Review of Lesley McAllister's Making Law
Matter: Environmental Protection and Legal Institutions in Brazil, 40
GEO.WASH. INT'L L. REV. 620, 624 (2009).
42. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,712.
43. Id.
44. UNICA's Comments, supra note 9, at 35.
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foreign renewable fuel producers, which have the effect of
impeding imports from entering the American market place.46
They therefore argue that the additional measures violate TBT
Article 2.1 and GATT Article IlI:4 by according "less favorable
treatment" to foreign produced biofuels, and GATT Article XI: 1 by
restricting imports.47 They further allege that EPA has "less
restrictive alternatives" available to ensure the requirements of
the RFS2 are met. In consequence, UNICA contends that the
current regime creates "unnecessary obstacles to trade," in
contravention of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.48 Critically,
UNICA suggests that discriminatory measures need not create
any particular degree of "less favorable treatment" or be
motivated by any protectionist aim to violate the stated
provisions. To the contrary, they argue that "any less favourable
treatment of foreign [renewable fuel producers] in connection
with documentation requirements concerning land use
restrictions and handling of feedstocks ... is in contravention of
TBT Article 2.1 and 2.2, as well as Article IlI:4 and XI: of the
GATT."49 UNICA appears to believe the relevant provisions of
the Agreements categorically ban asymmetrical compliance
regImes.

c. Presentation of the Operative Provisions
Because they factor so prominently in the later analysis, it is
appropriate to briefly examine the texts of Article IlI:4 of the
GATT, as well as Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
First, expressing one of the foundational principles of WTO
law, the national treatment obligation, Article IlI:4 of the GATT
obliges members to ensure that their internal regulations do not
discriminate against foreign goods. The core of the provision
provides as follows:

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
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The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use,50
In language closely resembling that used in Article IlI:4,
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement sets forth a complementary
"national treatment" obligation for a subset of "laws, regulations
and requirements," namely, technical regulations. It states that:
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations,
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any
other country. 51

Article 2.2, in turn establishes what is typically referred to as
a "least trade restrictive alternative" obligation for technical
regulations. In pertinent part it reads:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this
purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective.52

P arts III and IV of this article will provide a more detailed
analysis of these provisions and the complicated interplay
between them. First, though, this next section presents some
background information on the TBT Agreement and its
relationship to the GATT.

50. GATT, supra note 8, at Art. 111:4.
51. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 2.1.
52. Id. at art. 2.2.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE TBT AGREEMENT AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE GATT

a. Origins of the TBT Agreement
Throughout the early years of the GATT, parties to the
agreement focused on reducing overt barriers to trade.53 This is
to say that the focus was on reducing tariffs and other measures
that operated "at the border" to conspicuously block access to the
parties' national markets.54 Over time, as the GATT regime
achieved considerable success in reducing these explicit
barriers,55 the workings of another more invidious form of trade
discrimination came into the spotlight-internal domestic
regulations that, while purportedly adopted to further important
policy objectives such as consumer safety and environmental
protection, also have the effect of restricting imports.56 These
measures, which are referred to as non·tariff trade barriers
(NTBs), may be facially non·discriminatory and motivated by
genuine concern and yet still meaningfully slow the wheels of
international trade. As Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse
have explained, "even when there is no protectionist intent on the
part of lawmakers, through a lack of coordination, mere
differences in regulatory or standard· setting regimes can function
to impede trade."57

53. MICHAEL
TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE,
THE
REGULATION
OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 202 (3d ed. 2005).
54.Id.
55. Id. at 193.
56. See ROBERT E. BALDWIN, NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 1-2 (1970). Baldwin colorfully explained that, "the lowering of tariffs has,
in effect, been like draining a swamp ... [t]he lower water level has revealed all
the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away."
Id. at2.
57. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 53, at 202. Of course, facially neutral
product regulations also provide fertile ground for disguising protectionist
intentions. On this point, the EC-Asbestos panel observed that, "the purpose of
adopting the TET Agreement was to control the development and application of
standards-situations in which protectionist aims can be better disguised [than
in import bans} and for which the existing disciplines within the GATT
appeared to be inadequate," Panel Report, European Communities - Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ~ 8.49, WTIDS1351R (Sept.
18,2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC-Asbestos] (emphasis added).
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The national treatment obligations of the GATT are phrased
in broad enough terms to incorporate many (if not most) product
regulations and therefore impose some discipline on such
measures.58 Yet, by the late 1960s it was clear to the parties to
the GATT that the existing framework was insufficient to rein in
the proliferation of divergent product regulations that were
causing unnecessary inefficiencies. 59
The parties therefore
agreed to negotiate a new instrument.6o From the outset, though,
they were clear that the putative new instrument should "in no
way interferer 1 with the responsibility of governments for safety,
health and welfare of their people, or the protection of the
environment in which they live."61 Instead, it would "merely seek
. . . to minimize the effect of such actions on international
trade."62
The first agreement to specifically tackle product regulations
was titled the "Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade"63
(commonly referred to as the "Standards Code"). Negotiated
during the Tokyo Round, the Standards Code entered into force in
1980.64
The Standards Code supplemented the nondiscrimination obligations of the GATT by subjecting product
regulations to an additional layer of scrutiny. Gabrielle Marceau
and Joel Trachtman have succinctly described the agreement in
the following terms:

58. See GATT, supra note 8, at art. IlI:4 ("The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use.") (emphasis added).
59. See MacDonald, supra note 11, at 251; see also Gabrielle Marceau & Joel
P. Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 811,814 (2002).
60. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 814.
61. Id. (quoting Spec (71) 143 § III, Art. l(c) (Sept. 30, 1971)).
62. Id.
63. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405,
1186 UN.T.S. 276.
64. Doaa Abdel Motaal, The "Multilateral Scientific Consensus" and the
World Trade Organization, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 855, 855 (2004).
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Its main provisions prohibited discrimination and the protection
of domestic production through specifications, technical
regulations and standards; it also proscribed the preparation,
adoption and application of regulations, specifications and
standards in a manner more restrictive than necessary; and it
urged signatories to base their national measures on
international standards and to collaborate and co-operate
towards harmonization of such national norms.65

Regrettably, the Standards Code proved ineffective at
curbing disruptions to trade caused by product regulations.66
Several different shortcomings contributed to this failure. First,
the Standards Code was ridden with vague or ambiguous rules,
which made it difficult for parties to determine its effect ex ante.67
Beyond this, only forty-three of the parties to the GATT ever
assented to the agreement.68 The limited membership meant
that technical regulations in a large number of GATT member
states fell outside of the Standards Code's reach. Finally, the
Standards Code only covered measures that "lay down
characteristics of a product such as levels of quality, performance,
safety or dimension." This phrase was interpreted as excluding
process and production methods (PPMs).69
Each of these deficiencies was addressed during the Uruguay
Round negotiations. To cure defects resulting from the limited
number of signatories, which had undermined other plurilateral
GATT-era agreements as well, the negotiating parties established
the rule of the "single undertaking." The single undertaking put

65. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 814.
66. See JOHN H. BARTON ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRADE REGIME:
POLITICS, LAw, AND ECONOMICS OF THE GATT AND THE WTO 135 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 814.
69. BARTON ET AL., supra note 66, at 135 (citing Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, supra note 63, annex 1(1)). (Barton et al. lists a fourth reason
for the Standard Code's failure as well: the consensus-based dispute settlement
procedure that was in force under the GATT permitted any party to a dispute to
veto a panel's report from being adopted); see also BARTON ET AL., supra note 66,
at 69-71 (explaining the workings of the consensus-based GATT dispute
settlement).
As the consensus-based dispute settlement procedure was
abandoned when the WTO came into being, this is no longer an impediment to
the effective implementation of the TBT Agreement. BARTON ET AL., supra note
66, at 70·71.
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an end to the pre-Uruguay Round practice of enabling Members
of the GATT to pick and choose which additional trade
instruments they wished to join. Under the new arrangement,
states would have to assent to all agreements covered by the
WTO as a condition of membership. 70 The provisions of the
Standards Code were also made more precise and language was
inserted to grant jurisdiction over process and production
methods71 (though, as will be discussed in Part III, there is still
some ambiguity as to the extent to which PPMs were effectively
included). Furthermore, the Standards Code was split into two
separate instruments: the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures72 (SPS Agreement) and the present-day
TBT Agreement. The SPS Agreement was given dominion over
measures designed to protect "human, animal, and plant life or
health."73
The TBT Agreement, by contrast, was made
responsible for product regulations and standards that further a
broader range of policy objectives, including environmental
protection.74
It was explicitly not, however, to cover any
measures that fit within the SPS Agreement's mandate. 75

70. BARTON ET AL., supra note 66, at 47.

71. Id. at 136.
72. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 151994, 1867 UN.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
73. Id. at annex A. ,-r 1. To date, the SPS Agreement has been applied almost
exclusively to regulations that concern risks posed by the importation of food
and agricultural products. ROBERT HOWSE, PETRUS VAN BORK & CHARLOTTE
HABERBRAND, WTO DISCIPLINES AND BIOFUELS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

IN THE CREATION OF A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 23 (2006).

74. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at annex 1, ,-r 1.
75. Id. at art. 1.5 ("[t]he provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary
and phytosanitary measures as defined in Annex A of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.").
As an aside, delineating the precise relationship between the jurisdiction of the
SPS and TET Agreements poses, as Jacqueline Peel has put it, "a number of
thorny questions." Jacqueline Peel, A GMO by Any Other Name . .. Might be an
SPS Risk!; Implications of Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 1009, 1014 (2006). These
issues became even more complex after the release of the EC-Biotechs panel
report in the fall of 2006, which seemed to expand the scope of the SPS
Agreement into a domain that was once believed to be reserved for the TET
Agreement.
Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTIDS2911R, WTDS2921R,
WTIDS2931R (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotechs]. The unappealed EC-
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Residual non-tariff regulations that fell outside the scope of
either the SPS or the TBT Agreement were assigned to the GATT
alone.76 This division of labor between the agreements remains
in place today.
b_ Raising the stakes: increasing fears of interference
with national regulatory prerogative
The shift in focus from border measures to internal measures
that the TBT Agreement heralded carried important political
implications as it increased the probability that WTO law would
encroach upon Member states' right to pursue national policy
objectives as they saw fit.77 As previously noted, the parties to
the GATT foresaw the potential for this sort of conflict to arise
before even commencing negotiations on the Standards Code and
indicated a desire to avoid intruding upon legitimate expressions
of regulatory autonomy.78 The final text of the TBT Agreement
demonstrates sensitivity to this issue as well. Perhaps most
significantly, it allows parties to maintain trade-distorting
technical regulations that are necessary to fulfill a "legitimate

Biotechs decision also suggested that a single measure with multiple distinct
purposes could be considered both an SPS and TET measure. Id. ,-r,-r 7.164-65.
This article will not delve into the nuance of the SPS-TET interplay, nor will it
evaluate the feasibility of bringing an SPS claim against the RFS2. The reason
for this is that UNreA, like most academic commentators, focused exclusively on
the potential friction with the TET Agreement, which still appears the far more
likely avenue of attack. See, e.g., Mitchell & Tan, supra note 14 (acknowledging
that there may be a conflict between EU Sustainability Criteria for biofuels and
the TET Agreement or the GATT while omitting any discussion of a potential
conflict with the SPS Agreement).
76. Peel, supra note 75, at 1014.
77. The possibility of the WTO meddling with national regulatory prerogative
in this way has sparked fierce controversy over the years and made many
concerned citizens, particularly environmentalists, skeptical of the free trade
agenda. See ROBERT HOWSE & ELIZABETH TURK, THE WTO IMPACT ON INTERNAL
REGULATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE CANADA-EC ASBESTOS DISPUTE 283-84
(Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott, eds., 2001). For an excellent examination of
the tension between free trade and regulatory autonomy in the TBT Agreement,
see generally 1v1ichael Ming Du, Domestic Regulatory Autonomy Under the TBT
Agreement: From Non-Discrimination to Harmonization, 6 CHINESE J. OF INT'L L.
269 (2007).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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objective."79
Paragraph 6 of the preamble reinforces this
prerogative by stipulating that "no country should be prevented
from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its
exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive
practices, at the levels it considers appropriate."80 Unfortunately,
it is not always clear how to apply this preambulatory statement
when interpreting the articles in the body of the Agreement. As
will become evident in Part IV, to a certain extent, the weight
that one assigns to this pre ambulatory statement will determine
one's understanding of the overall balance that the TBT
Agreement strikes between trade facilitation and the
preservation of domestic regulatory autonomy.
c. Applying the GATT and TBT agreements in tandem:
overlapping jurisdiction but disparate outcomes
As UNICA's challenge to the RFS2 indicates, it is often the
case that both the GATT and the TBT Agreement apply to a
single dispute or measure.81 Concurrent application of the TBT
Agreement and the GATT makes sense in light of the similar
goals that the two agreements advance.82 At the same time, the
rules that each agreement prescribes are of course not identical.
Rather, as the Appellate Body explained in EC-Asbestos,83 the
TBT Agreement "imposes obligations on Members that seem to be
different from, and additional to, the obligations imposed on
Members under the GATT 1994."84 The overlapping jurisdiction
of the GATT and TBT Agreement, combined with disparate
obligations that each imposes, creates a possibility that two
agreements would prescribe conflicting outcomes in a given

79. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 2.2.
SO. Id. at pmbl. ~ 6.
81. See STEVE CHARNOVITZ, JANE EARLEY & ROBERT HOWSE, AN EXAMINATION
OF SOCIAL STANDARDS IN BIOFUELS SUSTAINABILITY CRITERIA 16 (2008), available
at http://www .agri trade .org Idocuments/Social Stnds_Biofuels_FINAL. pdf.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
83. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTIDS135/ABIR (Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter EC-Asbestos].
S4. Id. ~ SO (emphasis in original).
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dispute. The most obvious source of potential conflict concerns
the application of GATT Article XX.
The Dispute Settlement Body has yet to formally determine
whether Article XX can excuse a violation of the TBT
Agreement.85 Granting it is conceivable that Article XX could be
used to such effect, scholars who have examined the issue have
traditionally dismissed this possibility.86 The recent case law on
the subject, while not entirely conclusive, has also generally
supported the notion that Article XX cannot be used to this
effect.87

85. Panels have been confronted with this issue on at least two prior
occaSIOns. In both instances, however, it declined to address the issue for
reasons of judicial economy.
See Panel Report, European CommunitiesProtection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Product
and Foodstuffs,
7.440-7.476, WTIDS2901R (Mar. 15,2005) [hereinafter ECTrademark]; Panel Report, EC-Biotechs, supra note 75,
4.385, 7.2524·5,
WTIDS2911R, WTIDS2921R, WTIDS293 (Sept. 29, 2006).
86. See, e.g., Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 874 (stating that it
would take a "heroic approach to interpretation" to find that Article XX could be
invoked to justify a violation under another agreement in annex lA.); id. at 823
(stating that "[i]t is doubtful whether Article XX (or XXI) was expected to be
available to be invoked as a defence to a claim of violation of [TBT] Article 2.2").
87. For a brief while, following the release of the China - Measures Affecting
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products Appellate Body report in 2009, the idea
that Article XX could be applied to the TBT Agreement seemed fairly plausible.
Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products,
205·33, WTIDS363/ABIR (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter ChinaAudiovisuals]. In that case, the Appellate Body held that GATT Article XX
could be used as a defense against an alleged breach of the Chinese Accession
Protocol, despite the fact that the Accession protocol did not explicitly refer to
Article XX. See id.
The China-Audiovisuals holding was based on the interpretation of the
phrase, "[w]ithout prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a manner
consistent with the WTO Agreement," which appeared in the introductory
sentence of Article 5.1 of China's Accession Protocol. The Appellate Body read
this phrase as incorporating into Article 5.1 a reserved right for China to
regulate the trade of goods in a manner that is provided by GATT Article XX.
See id. Because this holding is grounded in the language of one particular
clause of China's Accession Protocol, it is not applicable to other agreements or
even other provisions of the Accession Protocol. In fact, in a subsequent dispute,
China-Measures Relating to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (ChinaRaw Materials), a panel refused to permit China to invoke Article XX as a
defense against a breach of a different provision of its Accession Protocol. See
Panel Report, China-Measures Relating to the Exportation of Various Raw
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Assuming Article XX is in fact unavailable to TBT litigants
as a defense, there is a real possibility that a measure that
comports with the GATT would nonetheless violate the TBT
Agreement.
In cases of conflict such as this, the General
Interpretative Note to Annex lA of the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization explains that the rule set forth in
latter agreement should prevail,88 which in this case is the TBT
Agreement. As the TBT Agreement does not offer any further
guidance on how to resolve conflicts with the GATT, the General
Interpretive Note provides the fallback position.89 Accordingly, if
a measure were to comply with the GATT, due to Article XX, but
were inconsistent with the TBT Agreement, the measure would
have to be struck down.
IV.

THE SCOPE OF THE TBT AGREEMENT: DOES
THE TBT AG REEMENT APPLY, AND IF SO,
WHICH PROVISIONS WOULD GOVERN THE
DISPUTE?

a. "Technical Regulations" and "Standards"
The TBT Agreement only covers
"technical
regulations,"90
measures:

three categories of
"standards,"91
and

n

Materials,
7.116·29, WTIDS3941R, WTIDS3951R, WTIDS3981R (July 5, 2011).
Furthermore, in the most recent case to present this issue, United States-Clove
Cigarettes, the U.S. decided to not even raise the possibility of using Article XX
to defend its ban on clove cigarettes from attack under Article 2 of the TET
Agreement. See Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ~ 7.296, WTIDS4061R (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter
U.S.-Clove Cigarettes]. Taken together, the evidence suggests that Article XX
could not be invoked to defend against alleged violations of the TET Agreement.
88. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lA, Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
89. Cf, SPS Agreement, supra note 72, at art. 2.4 (stating that "[s]anitary or
phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of
Members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of article XX(b)").
90. See TET Agreement, supra note 9, at arts. 2-3 (governing Technical
Regulations) .
91. See id. at art. 4 (governing "Preparation, Adoption and Application of
Standards").
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"conformity assessment procedures."92 If a non-tariff barrier does
not fit within the ambit of one of these three terms it will not be
subject to the rules that the TBT Agreement sets forth.
Therefore, a threshold question in any TBT analysis is whether
the measure at issue satisfies the definition of either "technical
regulation," "standard," or "conformity assessment procedure."
The term "conformity assessment procedures" is a derivative
term that incorporates the terms "technical regulations" and
"standards" into its definition. 93 As a result, even if one were to
ultimately conclude that the challenged compliance measures are
"conformity assessment procedures," for them to be covered by
the TBT Agreement, the requirements they seek to enforce would
have to count as either "technical regulations" or "standards."
For this reason, we must begin by examining whether the
environmental objectives contained in the challenged portion of
the RFS294 fit within either of these two categories.
Looking first at "Technical Regulations," Annex 1.1 of the
Agreement defines the term to mean:
[A] [d]ocument, which lays down product characteristic or their
related processes and production methods, including applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory.
It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they apply to a
product, process or production method.95

The term "Standards" is defined quite similarly to "Technical
Regulations," with the primary difference being that compliance

92. See id. at arts. 5-8 (governing "Conformity with Technical Regulations
and Standards").
93. See id. at annex 1.3 (stating that "[a]ny procedure used, directly or
indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or
standards are fulfilled.").
94. See US-Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 15, at 14 (indicating that the
Dispute Settlement Body should evaluate the character of the challenged
portion of a regulation, and not the regulation as a whole, when evaluating its
WTO consistency).
95. TBT Agreement, supra note 9, at Annex 1.1 (emphasis added).
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with the former is voluntary, whereas compliance with the latter
is mandatory.96
Because "mandatory" is not defined in the TBT Agreement, a
question arises as to whether a regulation which makes
compliance a precondition for receiving a certain privilege, but
not for selling one's goods in the national market without such
privilege, should be considered "mandatory." This distinction is
relevant to the classification of the RFS2 because, as mentioned
in Part II, the RFS2 does not require biofuels to be sustainable to
be sold in the US; instead, biofuels must only be produced
sustainably to generate RINs.97
For better or worse, the relevant WTO precedent strongly
indicates that measures that must be complied with in order to
receive privileged market access will be treated as mandatory
under the TBT Agreement. Specifically, in prior cases where noncompliance with the conditions set forth in a regulation created
appreciable trade disadvantages for that party, the Dispute
Settlement Body has deemed the relevant regulation to be de
facto mandatory, even where compliance was not necessary to
market the good.98 As the ability to generate RINs confers
significant
market
advantages
upon
renewable
fuel
producers/importers, the RFS2 rule would therefore probably be

96. "Standard" is defined as a "(d)ocument approved by a recognized body,
that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics
for products or related processes and production methods, with which
compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as they
apply to a product, process or production method." TET Agreement, supra note
4, at annex 1.2. See also Du, supra note 77, ,-r 34 (noting that the primary
difference between technical regulations and standards is that compliance with
technical regulations is mandatory whereas compliance with standards is
optional).
97. EPA RFS2 Final Rule Preamble, supra note 25, at 14,713.
98. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Descriptions of
Sardines, ~ 194, WTIDS2311ABIR (Sept. 26, 2002) (finding that a regulation
which set down restrictions on which species of fish that could be marketed as
"Sardines" in the EU counted as "mandatory" although species of fish that were
not eligible to be labeled "Sardines" could still being marketed in the EU under
another name); see also EC-Trademark, supra note 85, ,-r,-r 7.453-56 (finding that
a regulation with which compliance was necessary in order to receive the
benefits of registration was "mandatory" as that term is used in the definition of
"technical regulation").
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considered mandatory. If it is either, then, the relevant portion of
the RFS2 would likely be classified as a regulation and not a
standard.
i.

The controversy over "unincorporated PPMs"

And yet, there is still a distinct possibility that a panel would
find that the RFS2 falls outside the definition of "technical
regulation." The reason for caution on this matter harkens back
to a controversy that seems omnipresent in the trade-andenvironment discourse-namely, the debate over so-called
"unincorporated
process
and
production
methods"
(unincorporated PPMs).
Many WTO commentators advocate dividing the universe of
PPMs into two discrete categories: incorporated PPMs and
unincorporated PPMs.99 Broadly speaking, incorporated PPMs
seek to ensure the functionality or safety of goods in order to
protect the consumer who purchases them. An example of a
product-related PPM would be a regulation that forbids the
importation of shrimp that have been processed at facilities that
do not treat the shrimp with a certain anti-microbial solution.
Unincorporated PPMs, by contrast, seek to achieve some social
objective and do not tangibly impact the final good. An example
of an unincorporated PPM would be a regulation that forbids the
importation of shrimp that have been harvested in a way which
that may harm local marine life.
Those arguing in favor of applying this distinction to the TBT
Agreement typically point to the phrase "product characteristics
or their related processes and production methods" in the
definition of "technical regulation." As the argument goes, the
fact that PPMs must be "related to" a product characteristic to

99. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 11, at 255; l\IIitchell & Tan, supra note 14,
39·41; Du, supra note 77, ~ 40. See also Steve Charnovitz, The Law of
Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J.
INT'L L. 59, 65·66 (2002) (noting that while the related/unrelated distinction is
overly simplistic there is support for the distinction in the text and negotiating
history of the TET Agreement and it is pervasive in the relevant scholarly
discourse).
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count as a technical regulation suggests that only incorporated
PPMs are covered by the TBT Agreement.IOO
Even though the argument is not without controversy,IOI it
finds considerable support in the Appellate Body report from ECAsbestos. In EC-Asbestos the Appellate Body gave the following
interpretation of "product characteristics":
Thus, the ({characteristics" of a product include, In our VIew, any
objectively definable ({features)), ({ qualities)), ({ attributes)), or other
({distinguishing mark" of a product. Such ({characteristics)) might
relate, inter alia, to a product's composition, size, shape, colour,
texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity,
density, or viscosity. In the definition of ((technical regulation)) in
Annex 1.1, the TBT Agreement itself gives certain examples of
({product characteristics)) - ({terminology, symbols, packaging,
marking or labeling requirements)). These examples indicate
that ({product characteristics)) include, not only features and
qualities intrinsic to the product itself, but also related
({characteristics," such as the means of indication,
presentation and the appearance of a product. 102

the

100. See, e.g., Du, supra note 77, ~ 40.
101. Notably, the incorporatedlunincorporated related distinction IS
normatively somewhat problematic. The concerns stem from the fact that, if
unincorporated PPMs are excluded from the TBT Agreement the effect is not to
find them WTO inconsistent, but instead to evaluate them under the rules of the
GATT alone. It is difficult to understand why the parties would have wanted to
subject only incorporated PPMs to the TBT Agreement's disciplines. This is
particularly curious since one would imagine that incorporated PPMs are
typically more transparent with respect to regulatory purpose than are
unincorporated PPMs.
The Appellate Body might try to avoid this result by moving away from the
path that the Asbestos report set it upon, as that report did not directly consider
the issue of unincorporated PPMs; the Appellate Body still has ample room to
maneuver in this way. Whatever the merits of changing course might be,
however, the WTO's historically strong resort to textual literalism and respect
for prior decisions makes it seem somewhat unlikely-though certainly not
inconceivable-that it would abandon the incorporate/unincorporated distinction
on normative grounds anytime soon.
On the Dispute Settlement Body's
historical bias in favor of textual arguments, see HENRIK HORN & JOSEPH H. H.
WEILER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - TRADE DESCRIPTION OF SARDINES: TEXTUALISM
AND ITS DISCONTENT (2005).
102. EC-Asbestos, supra note 83, ~ 67.
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While the above list of potential "product characteristics" is
non-exhaustive, the fact that all of the listed "characteristics" are
detectible in the final good or some element of its packaging
suggests that the Appellate Body considered the term to be
limited as such. And, if "product characteristics" includes only
those features that are detectible in the finished good itself, it
would seem to follow that only those PPMs that leave a trace in
the finished good could reasonably be considered "related" to
"product characteristics."
The negotiating history seems to
support this interpretationl03 and this is the approach advocated
by many WTO members.104 If a panel or the Appellate Body
itself were to adopt this stance, and also characterize the
environmentally-geared PPMs in the RFS2 as unincorporated
PPMs, the regulation would fall outside of the TBT Agreement's
scope. In this case, biofuel policy-makers would be free from the
constraints the TBT Agreements impose.105
It is plausible, but not certain, that the PPMs of the RFS2
would be deemed unincorporated. To understand why this is so,
it is important to keep in mind that the RFS2 implements two
separate environmentally-geared PPMs, each of which factors
differently in the PPM paradigm. First, the regulation sets forth
strict controls on the type of land from which biofuels feedstock
can be harvested. These land-use restrictions bare no discernible
connection to the physical good.
Therefore, we can easily
characterize land-use restrictions as unincorporated. The second
type of PPM in the RFS2-the threshold lifecycle GHG emissions
reductions-is more challenging to classify. Still, as described

103. See WTO Secretariat, Negotiating History of the Coverage of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with regard to Labeling Requirements,
Voluntary Standards, and Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to
131, 146, G/TBT/W/ll (Aug. 29, 1995).
Product Characteristics,
104. See SIMONETTA ZARRILLI, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., MAKING

n

CERTIFICATION WORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPlVIENT: THE CASE OF BIOFUELS 31,

U.N.

Doc.

UNCTAD/DICT/TED/2008/1

(2008),

available

at

http://www .unctad.org/en/doc s/di tcted20081_en. pdf.

105. As an aside, it is more likely that the term "standards" would be
interpreted as covering non-product related PPMs. See Sanford E. Gaines,
Process and Production Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for
Environmental-PPM Based Trade Measures? 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 384, 396-97
(2002).
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below, there are strong grounds to believe that this PPM should
also be considered unincorporated.
Biofuels' lifecycle GHG emissions are predominantly
generated via derivative activities, such as the manufacturing
process, transportation of the fuels, or land use changes that
result from increased demand for feedstock. As none of these
derivative sources of emissions are detectable in the finished
product itself, they should be considered unincorporated. The
only GHG emissions that are intrinsic to the final product, and
are therefore "detectable," are tailpipe emissions, which comprise
just a tiny fraction of the fuel's lifecycle emissions. To illustrate,
tailpipe emissions account for approximately one percent of
emissions from corn ethanol produced at plants using natural gas
for process energyl06 and approximately two percent of emissions
from rapeseed biodiesel produced at plants using natural gas.107
As such, if a tribunal were to assess the gestalt of the lifecycle
emissions-criteria to determine whether they "relate" to "product
characteristics" it would likely find that they do not satisfy the
definition of the term as laid down in the Asbestos ruling. Under
this scenario, the RFS2 would be considered to fall outside of the
TBT Agreement's scope.
A tribunal may reach a different conclusion though if instead
of focusing on the general character of the emissions
requirements it chose to dis aggregate a fuel's lifecycle GHG
emissions into its component inputs- land use changes, process
energy, tailpipe emission, etc. Under this fragmented approach,
one may conclude that because a single variable in the equation,
tailpipe emissions, contributes to a fuel's lifecycle emissions,
lifecycle GHG emissions "relate" to a "product characteristic."
Andrew Mitchell and Christopher Tan adopted this approach in a
paper analyzing the WTO consistency of the EU sustainability
criteria. lOB

106. U.s. EPA, RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD PROGRAM (RFS2) REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS 470 fig. 2.6·2 (2010).
107. See Supplemental Determination for Renewable Fuels Produced Under
the RFS2 Program from Canola Oil, 75 Fed. Reg. 59,622, 59,62S·29 (Sept. 2S,
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. SO).
lOS. Mitchell and Tan, supra note 14, ~ 6.
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However, the dis aggregated approach to characterizing
lifecycle emissions is problematic because it is impossible to
isolate those measures that regulate tailpipe emissions from
those that regulate all other "unincorporated" sources of lifecycle
emissions. As a result, the dis aggregated approach has the effect
of bringing a huge portion of the RFS2 regulation within the TBT
Agreement's jurisdiction based on only a fairly inconsequential
part of the regulation. This seems excessively formalistic and
calls
into
question
the
basis
for
maintammg
the
incorporated/unincorporated distinction. Mter all, it is hardly
any easier to determine a fuel's lifecycle GHG emissions from
examining the one-to-two percent of emissions released by the
finished product than it is to determine the type of land on which
its feedstock was grown.
To date, neither the Appellate Body nor a panel has
considered a case in which it has needed to dis aggregate a PPM
in the manner described above in order to find grounds for
applying one of the WTO Agreements. It thus remains unclear
how the Appellate Body would respond if presented with the
question in the context of biofuels regulations. Accordingly, for
the sake of completeness, the remainder of the analysis proceeds
on the perhaps dubious assumption that the environmental
provisions of the RFS2 would in fact be classified as "technical
regulations" and the TBT Agreement would therefore apply.
h. "Conformity Assessment Procedures"
Assuming, arguendo, that the environmentally-geared
provisions of the RFS2 rule are "technical regulations," for the
reasons described below, the compliance mechanisms challenged
by UNICA appear to fit much more naturally within the
definition of a "conformity assessment procedures" than
"technical regulations." They should be analyzed accordingly.
Annex 1.3 defines "conformity assessment procedures" as
"[a]ny procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that
relevant requirements in a technical regulation or standards are
fulfilled."lo9 The related explanatory note further specifies that

109. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at annex 1.3.
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"[c]onformity assessment procedures include, inter alia,
procedures for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation,
verification and assurance of conformity; registration,
accreditation and approval as well as their combinations."llo
There is no case law directly interpreting this definition.lll
Nonetheless, a plain language reading of the provision strongly
suggests that the challenged compliance measures, which include
obligations such as the requirement to complete additional attest
engagements and to provide third-party engineering reports, fall
within its reach. This conclusion gains support from the ECTrademarks decision. In that case, the panel found a series of
inspection procedures fell outside of the scope of "technical
regulation"ll2 and indicated that they should be classified as
conformity assessment procedures instead.ll3
Notably, the EC-Trademarks Panel report asserted that
while a given regulatory measure may contain both a "technical
regulation" and a "conformity assessment procedure" the two
terms are distinct and mutually exclusive.ll4 Although this
report was not appealed, denying the Appellate Body a chance to
confirm or refute the Panel's view of the interplay between the
two terms, it suggests that each component-part of a measure
should be classified as either one or the other, but not both. As
the specific compliance procedures challenged by UNI CA fit more
naturally within the definition of "conformity assessment
procedure," if the TBT Agreement applies, the measures should
first and foremost be evaluated under Article 5.
So, why might UNICA have treated the compliance
mechanisms as technical regulations? Perhaps it was simply due
to the fact that Article 2 received far more attention in the

110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. The Panel report in United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna II, DS381, which was due to be released in the
summer of 2011, may provide further clarification on this matter.
112. See EC-Trademarks, supra note 85, ~ 7.515.
113. See id. ,-r 7.513 (stating, "we note that the explanatory note refers to
'procedures for
inspection' as an exmnple of conformity assessment
procedures. This suggests that a procedure for inspection is not a technical
regulation.").
114. Id. ~ 7.512.
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previous disputes than Article 5,115 making Article 2 more salient
to UNICA commenters. It is also possible that the commenters
anticipated certain strategic advantages to challenging the
additional compliance mechanisms under Article 2 as opposed to
Article 5. These strategic advantages are explored below.

v.

THE REGULATION OF "CONFORMITY
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES" UNDER
ARTICLE 5.1.1 AND 5.1.2

Mimicking the design of TBT Article 2, TBT Article 5 begins
with two prOVlSlOns which establish that: (1) conformity
assessment procedures must comply with the national treatment
and most-favored nation principles (Article 5.1.1); and (2)
conformity assessment procedures must not create unnecessary
obstacles to trade (Article 5.1.2). As the analogues of Articles 2.1
and 2.2, if UNICA were to have correctly identified the
compliance measures as "conformity assessment procedures,"
they would have attacked the measures under Articles 5.1.1 and
5.1.2 (either in place of their Article 2 claims or as alternative
claims).
The interaction between each of these Article 5
provisions and the compliance regime that the RFS2 prescribes
will be discussed in turn below.
a_ TBT Article 5_1.1
In its entirety, Article 5.1.1 reads:
[Members shall ensure that] conformity assessment procedures
are prepared, adopted and applied so as to grant access for
suppliers of like products originating in the territories of other
Members under conditions no less favourable

than those

accorded to suppliers of like products of national origin or
originating in any other country in a comparable situation; access
entails suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity under the

rules of the procedure, including when foreseen by this

115. Article 2 has been the subject of several high profile WTO disputes,
including EC-Asbestos, EC-Sardines, EC-Trademark, and most recently, u.s.Clove Cigarettes. By contrast, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body has
issued a holding that applies or interprets Article 5.
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procedure,

the possibility to have conformity assessment
activities undertaken at the site of facilities and to receive the

mark of the system.116
When analyzing the similar national treatment obligation
contained in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, both the U.S.Cloves Cigarettes Panel117 and the EC- Trademark Panel
116. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 5.1.1.
117. See Panel Report, U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, ~ 7.296, WTIDS4061R (Sept. 2,
2011). In September 2011, shortly before this article entered into production, a
panel released its report in the U.S.-Cloves Cigarette dispute. In this report, the
panel considered a number of matters of first impression concerning Articles 2.1
and 2.2 of the TET Agreement. At issue in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes was a U.S. ban
on the importation of flavored cigarettes, which studies have shown are
particularly appealing to youths. See id. ,-r,-r 7.337-38. The U.S. measure
banned all flavored cigarettes except for menthol cigarettes, large quantities of
which are produced in the United States. Id.,-r 2.4. The stated purpose of the
ban was to reduce youth smoking. Id.,-r 2.7. Indonesia, which is the primary
producer of clove cigarettes, complained that, among other problems, the U.S.
ban violated Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the TET Agreement. Id. ~ 3.1.
Although the panel ultimately concluded that the U.S. measure violated
Art. 2.1, it seems to have collapsed some elements of a typical GATT XX claim
into its Art. 2.1 analysis. In so doing, it interpreted the provision in a manner
that affords a degree of deference to regulatory prerogative. Specifically, the
panel acknowledged that preventing youth smoking was a legitimate objective
and that this legitimate objective must be taken into account in evaluating a 2.1
claim. Id.,-r 7.286. It further specified that a discriminatory measure that
serves a legitimate objective could pass muster under TBT art. 2.1, "provided it
respects the boundaries set forth in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement such as not
being a measure more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate
objective." Id. ,-r 7.290. The reason the panel ended up invalidating the U.S.
measure is because it rejected the U.S. claim that differential treatment of clove
and menthol cigarettes furthered the stated aim of reducing youth smoking. Id.
,-r 7.287. In the panel's words, its finding was based on the fact that "the United
States is not banning menthol cigarettes because it is not a type of cigarette
with a characterizing flavour that appeals to youths, but rather because of the
costs that might be incurred as a result of such a ban." Id. ,-r 7.289. One could
imagine the panel using a similar rationale to strike down the measure under
the chapeau of GATT XX, if it had considered the GATT XX defense.
With the ink on this decision still barely dry, it is difficult to predict what
its impact will be. At the time of this writing, neither party had indicated that
it intended to appeal the decision but there was ample time left in the sixty-day
window to do so. Particularly seeing as the panel report ruled on several issues
of first impression, it is quite unclear how the Appellate Body would treat these
issues on appeal. Furthermore, even if the decision were to stand, it is unclear
how exactly it would prejudice a later tribunal's interpretation of the scope of
Art. 5.1.1, which, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 139-141 infra,
contains some notable textual differences from TBT 2.1. For these reasons, the
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concluded that the basic elements of a violation of Article 2.1
were: "that the measure at issue is a 'technical regulation'; that
the imported and domestic products at issue are 'like products'
within the meaning of that provision; and that the imported
products are accorded 'less favourable' treatment than that
accorded to like domestic products." 118 This three-prong test,
which closely resembles that used to evaluate national treatment
claims brought under GATT Article IlI:4119 is essentially just a
recitation of the definitional elements contained in Article 2.1. As
Article 5.1.1 shares these elements with Article 2.1, future
tribunals would probably use a similar framework as a starting
point for their analysis of Article 5.1.1. However, there would be
two important alterations.
The first alteration is obviously that a measure would have to
satisfy the definition of "conformity assessment procedure" rather
than "technical regulation." The difference between these two
terms has already been discussed at length above.120 The second
alteration is that "likeness," which has played such a prominent
role in the GATT IlI:4 jurisprudence, is unlikely to receive much
attention here. Since the very goal of conformity assessment
procedures is to ensure uniformity in a category of products, it
seems the defending party would generally find it difficult to
claim the foreign products are "unlike."
The element likely to occupy much more of the litigants'
attention in a potential 5.1.1 analysis, and be most controversial,
remainder of this article takes somewhat of a detached approach to the legal
conclusions reached in the U.S.-Clove Cigarettes panel report. The panel's
statements on relevant issues will be diligently noted throughout, however; no
attempt has been made to ensure that the discussion about Arts. 5.1.1 and 5.1.2
precisely tracks the Panel's assessment of Arts. 2.1 and 2.2.
118. EC-Trademark, supra note 85, ,-r 7.444. See U.S-Clove Cigarettes, supra
note 87,
7.76·78.
119. See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ~ 133, WTIDSI611ABIR, WTIDS169/ABIR (Dec. 11,
2000) [hereinafter Korea-BeefJ (stating that "[f]or a violation of Article I1I:4 to be
established, three elements must be satisfied: that the imported and domestic
products at issue are 'like products'; that the measure at issue is a 'law,
regulation, or requirement affecting the internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use'; and that the imported products
are accorded 'less favourable' treatment than that accorded to like domestic
products.").
120. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96 and 109-114.
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is that of "less favourable treatment." With no case law directly
on point,121 there remains considerable uncertainty about how to
interpret this prohibition.
Perhaps the most fundamental
question facing any tribunal interpreting the less favorable
treatment prohibition is, how much weight should be accorded to
the jurisprudence that has developed under Article IlI:4 of the
GATT? One option is to simply equate the prohibition contained
in Article IlI:4 with that of Article 5.1.1 and directly apply the
jurisprudence that has developed under Article IlI:4 to the TBT
Agreement.122 In the alternative, a tribunal could perform a
more context-specific analysis of the term as used in Article 5.1.1,
acknowledging the jurisprudence that has developed under the
GATT, while also tailoring its interpretation to reflect the
particularized goals of the TBT Agreement and the specific text
that Article 5.1.1 provides. The doctrinal pros and cons of each of
these options, as well as the consequences for the RFS2, will be
elaborated upon below. As will be explained, the first route
carries several hazards-even more so with respect to Article
5.1.1 than Article 2.1-and should be avoided. The second option
side-steps these hazards and is therefore preferable.
L

Interpretative option #1: Equivalence to GATT
IlI:4

If a tribunal were to take the first route and directly apply
the Article IlI:4 jurisprudence to Article 5.1.1, it would in all
likelihood prove fatal to the RFS2. The reasoning behind this
stark assessment is as follows:
Although the precise formulation of the test has ebbed and
flowed over the years,123 the central question posed by a GATT
IlI:4 less favorable treatment inquiry has traditionally been
whether the measure "modifies the conditions of competition to
the detriment of importers."124 In an early WTO-era dispute,
121. See supra note 115, with accompanying text.
122. U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 18, ~ 7.91.
123. For a detailed description of the vicissitudes of the Appellate Body's
national treatment jurisprudence, see Nicolas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn,
Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart of Two Sides
of the Same Coin? 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 63·65 (2008).
124. See Korea-Beef, supra note 119, ~ 144.
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Korea-Beef, the Appellate Body explained that while Article IlI:4
does not per se prohibit measures that treat foreign and domestic
goods differently, it does prohibit measures distinguishing
between foreign and domestic goods to the disadvantage of the
foreign goods.125 In the years since Korea-Beef, the Appellate
Body has refined and seemingly relaxed the rigor of the
competition-based standard with respect to facially origin neutral
measures.126 However, as the RFS2 explicitly discriminates
between biofuel producers on the basis of their nationality, it
could not be considered origin neutral and would most likely be
evaluated under the cruder competition standard that Korea-Beef
set forth.
Under this standard, presuming Brazil127 could
demonstrate that the additional compliance obligations imposed
on foreign producers materially alter the conditions of
competition to the detriment of imported products, the measures
would be found to violate GATT IlI:4. 128 Consequently, they
would violate Article 5.1.1 as well.

125. See id. ~ 144. See also EC-Asbestos, supra note 83, ~ 100.
126. See Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the
Import and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, ~ 96, WTIDS302/ABIR (Apr. 25, 2005)
[hereinafter Dominican Republic-Cigarettes] (stating that claims of "less
favourable treatment" will not be sustained "if the detrimental effect is
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the
product.").
127. Only WTO Members have standing to bring cases before the Dispute
Settlement Body of the WTO. See generally Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (considering only the rights of member states to bring
cases before the dispute settlement system). For this reason, Brazil, rather than
UNleA, would have to be the party to argue this hypothetical case against the
United States.
128. Regarding facially discriminatory measures, Robert Howse et al., have
written: "Based on the case law on Article III of the GATT, there is little
question but that it mandates that explicitly or facially discriminate in favor of
domestic products over imports, for instance through requiring that the mandate be fulfilled in whole or in part using domestically -sourced biofuels would
violate Article IlI:4 of the GATT." HOWSE ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark
not defined., at 25 (emphasis added).
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Interpretative option #2: Something narrower
than GATT 111:4

The good news for the United States in this hypothetical
dispute is that there is good reason to believe the interpretation
of the "less favourable treatment" prohibition of Article 5.1.1
should deviate from that of GATT 111:4. In fact, the recent U.SClove Cigarettes Panel appeared aware of the pitfalls that direct
application of the GATT jurisprudence poses, repeatedly stressing
the need to employ a context-specific approach for interpreting
Article 2.1.129 As will be described, the arguments against direct
transposition are even stronger with respect to Article 5.1.1 than
Article 2.1.
The first argument against the direct equivalence approach
derives from the language of the TBT Agreement preamble.
Specifically, the second recital of the TBT Agreement states that
the Agreement "[desires] to further the objectives of the
GATT."13o This language implies that where possible, the TBT
Agreement should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
rights and obligations to which the parties committed themselves
under the GATT. Paragraph 6 of the preamble, which was
modeled after GATT Article XX,131 reiterates the need for

129. See e.g., U.S-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 7.117 ("we conclude that
our approach to interpreting Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement must ensure that
the TBT Agreement is addressed first as immediate context of Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement. The jurisprudence under Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994,
which provision also serves as context albeit not immediate, may also be
considered."). See also U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 254 C[w]hile we
agree with the parties that the similarity in wording [between TET 2.1 and
GATT IlI:4] must be given weight, we do so cautiously because, as noted by the
Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos, even to the extent that the terms used are
identical, they 'must be interpreted in light of the context and of the object and
purpose, of the provision at issue, and of the object and purpose of the covered
agreement in which the provision appears."').
130. TET Agreement, supra note 9, ~ 2. Notably, both the EC-Trademarks
and U. S. -Clove Cigarettes panel reports acknowledged that the second preamble
recital provided relevant context for interpreting TBT 2.1. See EC-Trademarks,
supra note 85, ~ 7.464 and U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ~ 7.116 Gointly
referring to the second and sixth preambular recitals).
131. See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 7.360. See also EC-Asbestos,
supra note 83, ,-r 855 n.41 ("the preparatory work on the Agreement to Technical
Barriers to Trade in the Tokyo Round show that the TBT Agreement that
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symbiotic interpretation of the two agreements by recalling
member states' right to maintain policies of the sort that are
protected by Article XX.132 Without a general exception provision
in the TBT Agreement which approximates that found in the
GATT, equating the scope and stringency of the less favorable
treatment prohibition in the TBT Agreement with that in Article
IlI:4 could produce awkwardly incongruent outcomes between the
two agreements, with the TBT Agreement denying Members the
right to maintain regulations which Article XX of the GATT
expressly permits.133 Such a result would seem to flout the
directives given in the two aforementioned recitals of the
preamble.
The most natural way in which tribunals interpreting Article
5.1.1 can circumvent this sort of conflict is to narrow the scope of
the less favorable treatment inquiry under Article 5.1.1 as
compared with Article IlI:4. Fortunately, the text of Article 5.1.1
provides clear guidance on how it should be constrained: whereas
GATT IlI:4, 134 like TBT Article 2.1,135 blanketly prohibits
technical regulations from according "less favorable" treatment,
Article 5.1.1 confines itself to ensurmg that conformity
should have emerged from the Tokyo Round was already seen as being a
development of the existing rules of the GATT, notably Article XX.").
132. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at prmbl. ,-r 6.
133. Marceau & Trachtman made a similar observation regarding the
relationship between Article 2.1 of the TET Agreement and the GATT:
Problems may occur if the scope of the term 'like products' is the
same as that under Article IIl:4, which the justifications under
Article XX are not available to violations of Article 2.1 TET. It is
conceivable that the 'accordion' of like products may allow a
distinction between 'like' products of GATT Article III (or I) and that
of 2.1 TBT. The emphasis of the Appellate Body on the 'no less
favourable' language may serve as a less strained defence for nonprotectionist domestic regulation and therefore reduce the need to
invoke Article XX to justify measures based on listed nonprotectionist policy goal. Otherwise we would be faced with an
incongruous situation where for instance many of the environmentbased technical regulations could be inconsistent with Article 2.1
while the same regulations would be authorized by Article XX (after
a prior determination that it was prima facie inconsistent with
Article IlI:4 of GATT. Marceau & Trachtman, supra note 59, at 82223 (internal citation omitted).
134. See supra note 50 with accompanying text.
135. See supra note 52 with accompanying text.
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assessment procedures grant foreign suppliers "access" that is "no
less favorable" than that granted to domestic suppliers. The
second sentence of Article 5.1.1 gives color to the meaning of
"access" as used in this context by explaining it "entails a
suppliers' right to an assessment of conformity under the rules of
the procedure."136 This specification strongly indicates that the
primary aim of Article 5.1.1 is to discipline states who resist
applying published conformity assessment procedures to a foreign
product in order to block entry into the national market place.
The list of requirements in Article 5.2, which are designed to
"implement the provisions of Paragraph 1," supports this processoriented interpretation by focusing on matters such as ensuring
that states publish how they will carry out a conformity
assessment procedure.137 Moreover, the fact that the drafters
elected not to use the word "include" or "inter alia:' before the
specification provided by the second sentence of Article 5.1.1, as
they did in the second sentence of Article 5.1.2, suggests they may
have intended 5.1.1 to be limited to this purpose.
Stated differently, Article 5.1.1 could reasonably be read as
requiring Members to faithfully implement their published
conformity assessment procedures to evaluate foreign goods in a
fair manner, but not to ensure that the assessment procedures
devised impose equal burdens on all parties. Under this reading,
the latter investigation would be reserved for Article IlI:4, which,
covering all "laws, regulations and requirements,"138 would
almost certainly govern conformity assessment procedures as
wel1.139 If this interpretation were adopted, the challenged RFS2

136. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 5.1.1 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at art. 5.2.
138. GATT, supra note 8, at art. 111:4.
139. Notably, Robert Howse and Elizabeth Turk envisioned a similar division
of responsibility between TET 2.1 and GATT IlI:4. See HOWSE & TURK, supra
note 77, at 309. In their scheme, TET 2.1 is read as calling for a due processtype inquiry into the regulatory process that was used to generate conformity
assessment procedures and how they are currently applied. See HOWSE & TURK,
supra note 77, at 309. GATT IlI:4, by contrast, provides an opportunity to
investigate whether the conformity assessment procedures as designed accord
"less favourable treatment." HOWSE & TURK, supra note 77, at 309; see also Du,
supra note 77, ,-r 30 (describing the procedural nature of the obligations imposed
by the TET Agreement as compared to the GATT).
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provisions might very well be consistent with Article 5.1.1, so
long as they were applied in practice as promised on paper.
Some might suspect this reading gives Article 5.1.1 a more
limited scope than is credible. But guaranteeing that members
have the right to have their products fairly assessed under the
published procedure is far from a trivial concern. In fact, the
EC's foot-dragging in assessing whether genetically modified
organisms should be approved for sale in the EU was the focus of
the EC-Biotechs140 dispute. Although EC-Biotechs was primarily
an SPS case, rather than a TBT case, it illustrates the havoc that
a failure to apply a given conformity assessment procedure can
reap on international trade.
b_ Article 5_1.2
Like Article 5.1.1, the prohibition against "unnecessary
obstacles to trade" in Article 5.1.2 closely resembles its Article 2
analogue.
In fact, save for the substitution of the phrase
"technical regulation" for "conformity assessment procedure," the
first sentences of the two provisions are identical. Article 5.1.2
provides:
[Member shall ensure that] conformity assessment procedures
are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the
effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.
This means, inter alia, that conformity assessment procedures

shall not be more strict or be applied more strictly than is
necessary to give the importing Member adequate confidence

that products conform with the applicable technical regulations
or standards, taking account of the risks non-conformity would
create.141

The text of this provision is inherently open-ended and prior
to the U.S.-Clove Cigarettes dispute, neither Article 5.1.2 nor the
analogous Article 2.2 had been rigorously analyzed by a WTO
140. See EC-Biotechs, supra note 75. The EC-Biotech Panel report determined
that the EC had implemented a de facto moratorium on approving GMOs, which
caused "undue delay" in the processing of GMO product applications in violation
of Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement. See EC-Biotechs, supra note 75,
~

8.6·.7.

141. TET Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 5.1.2.
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panel or the Appellate Body.142 However, it is notable that
Article 5.1.2 closely resembles Article XX(b)-(d) of the GATT. 143
Furthermore, as the US-Clove Cigarettes panel observed in
analyzing Article 2.2, the sixth recital of the preamble to the TBT
Agreement, which provides context for interpreting Article 5.1.2,
"essentially reproduces the language contained in Article XX of
the GATT 1994."144 Accordingly, in contrast to Article 5.1.1,
interpreting Article 5.1.2 in a manner which tracks the
jurisprudence that has developed under the complementary
article of the GATT, supports the goals expressed in the preamble
of the TBT Agreement.145 For these reasons, and as the panel
found in U.S.-Clove Cigarettes with respect to Article 2.2,146 the
prohibition against unnecessary obstacles to trade in Article 5.1.2
should be interpreted in a manner which accords with the
tribunals' understanding of the word "necessity" as the word is
used in the Article XX(b)-(d) of the GATT.147 In consequence, this
section examines current jurisprudence on the meaning of
"necessity" under GATT Article XX.

142. See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ~ 7.329 n.614 (noting the lack of
prior case law concerning Article 2.2).
143. See id. ~ 7.358 (describing the similarity between GATT Article XX and
TET 2.2).
Together with its chapeau, Article XX reads: "Subject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health." GATT, supra note 8, Art. XX.
144. U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87, ~ 7.368.
145. See supra notes 141-144 with accompanying text.
146. See U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra note 87,,-r 7.368.
147. Notably, as Indonesia asserted in the U.S.-Clove Cigarettes dispute, all
third parties who addressed the issue in their submissions and oral arguments
supported the notion that the jurisprudence on Article XX(b) of the GATT could
be applied to Article 2.2 of the TET Agreement. U.S.-Clove Cigarettes, supra
note 87, ,-r 7.314. The United States alone took issue with this approach,
arguing that the panel should instead apply the test that had been developed to
analyze claims brought under Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. See U.S.-Clove
Cigarettes, supra note 87, ,-r 7.353.
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The concept of necessi ty under the GATT and
Article 5.1.2

In its Brazil- Tyres report, the Appellate Body articulated a
two·step inquiry to the question of "necessity" under Article
XX(b).14B In the first step, a panel must "assess all the relevant
factors, particularly the extent of the contribution to the
achievement of a
measure's objective and its trade
restrictiveness, in light of the importance of the interests or
values at stake."149 If the balancing test performed in the first
stage of analysis "yields a preliminary conclusion that the
measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing
the measure with its possible alternatives."150 A measure will
not be deemed "necessary" if there is a reasonably available
alternative that is less trade· restrictive and affords an equivalent
degree of protection.151
In explaining how to operationalize this "least restrictive
alternative" test-which is included in the text of 5.1.2 almost
verbatim-the Appellate Body emphasized that, "in order to
qualify as an alternative, a measure proposed by the complaining
Member must not only [be] less trade restrictive than the
measure at issue, but should also 'preserve for the responding
Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with
respect to the objective pursued."'152 It continued to explain that:
"if the complaining Member has put forward a possible
alternative measure, the responding Member may seek to show
that the proposed measure does not allow it to achieve the level of

148. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreaded Tyres, WTIDS332/ABIR (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil-Tyres].
149. Id. ~ 156. See also Korea-Beef, supra note 119, ~ 164 (stating that an
assessment of necessity under GATT Art. XX(d) involves "a process of weighing
and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution
made by the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at
issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or
exports.").
150. Brazil-Tyres, supra note 148, ,-r 156.
151. Brazil-Tyres, supra note 148, ,-r 156.
152. Id. (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ~ 308, WTIDS285/ABIR
(Apr. 72005)).
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protection it has chosen and, therefore, is not a genume
alternative."
Thus, the Appellate Body will not allow one
Member to undermine another's chosen level of protectiveness by
forcing the defending Member to choose an alternative that
affords any lesser degree of protection than it has chosen for
itself.
As applied to the RFS2, whether or not the asymmetrical
compliance procedures should be considered "unnecessary" under
5.1.2 depends on a factual assessment of the equivalence of any
measure that Brazil or another complainant put forward. The
case law makes clear, however, that the trade-restrictive U.S.
regime does not in any way pre-judge a violation of 5.1.2.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Asymmetrical compliance procedures of the sort the RFS2
prescribes should not be considered per se prohibited by the TBT
Agreement. In order to find that the TBT Agreement even
applies to the matter at hand, a tribunal would have to either
bring unincorporated PPMs within the ambit of the Agreement or
endorse what has been termed the dis aggregated approach to
evaluating whether a PPM is unincorporated. Both moves would
set it in unchartered waters. Moreover, if the TBT Agreement
were found to apply, there is still room in the letter of Articles
5.1.1 or 5.1.2 for a tribunal to permit a state to impose disparate
burdens on foreign and domestic suppliers where doing so IS
genuinely necessary to advance a legitimate objective.
To be sure, cavernous lacunae remain in the TBT
jurisprudence and it is difficult to predict how future tribunals
will interpret the restrictions of either Article 2 or Article 5. Yet
should they wish to take a restrained approach and protect the
careful balance between regulatory autonomy and trade
facilitation that is enshrined in the GATT, they will find ample
room to do so.
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